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Introduction
Like most law professors and deans, we left jobs as practicing lawyers to 
become law teachers and teach a variety of traditional doctrinal courses, both 
large classes and seminars. As what some refer to as “classroom” or “podium” 
law professors, we exercise the same professional judgments regarding 
course content, casebooks, class lectures and discussion, and grades as other 
professors. In making those judgments, we look to legal academy norms of 
academic freedom and the allocation of decision making between deans and 
faculty to guide decisions and resolve disagreements over teaching approaches 
and materials.
But we have not just been teaching in the classroom. We also have been 
practicing law as clinical teachers. Unlike other courses where the teaching 
usually influences only the students in the classroom, law clinic courses also 
influence clients, opposing parties, and others. These external effects of 
lawyering in the academy raise a set of academic freedom and professional 
responsibility issues distinct from law school classroom teaching.
The professional standard for academic freedom traditionally guarantees 
teachers “freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject” provided the 
teachers do not “introduce into their teaching controversial matter which has 
no relation to their subject.”1 Such freedom protects the learning process and 
promotes the common good, which “depends upon the free search for truth 
1. American Association of University Professors, 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic 
Freedom and Tenure with 1970 Interpretive Comments, reprinted in AAUP, Policy Documents 
& Reports 3, 10th ed. (Washington, D.C., 2006) [hereinafter Redbook]. The 1940 Statement 
and 1970 Interpretive Comments were jointly drafted by the AAUP and the Association of 
American Colleges and Universities. 
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and its free exposition.”2 As Matthew Finkin and Robert Post point out, the 
underlying premise for pedagogical academic freedom “is that students cannot 
learn how to exercise mature independence of mind unless their instructors are 
themselves free to model independent thought in the classroom.”3 Teaching 
through experiential learning methods in the sciences, medicine, law, and 
other fields defines the “classroom” broadly to include wherever the teaching 
and learning take place, which may be in a field setting, hospital, law clinic 
office, or courtroom.
Lawyering in the academy has become increasingly prevalent since the 
1970s when law school clinics started to flourish. Today, the American Bar 
Association (ABA) requires every accredited law school to offer substantial 
opportunities in live-client or other real-life practice experiences.4 As a result, 
there are law clinics in almost every law school, with the AALS Directory of 
Law Teachers listing nearly 1400 full-time faculty teaching clinical courses.5 In 
addition to lawyering in clinics, a number of law professors act as attorneys 
in cases handled as part of law school seminars,6 applied legal research and 
writing classes,7 or live-client components of related upper-level substantive 
courses.8
The legal academy has given little thought to how practicing law within law 
schools affects professional responsibilities and is different from representing 
clients in a traditional law firm or how notions of academic freedom affect 
lawyering in law schools. Yet repeated attempts to interfere with law clinic 
representation starkly illustrate how lawyering in the academy might be 
different, under notions of professional responsibility and academic freedom, 
from other lawyering or typical law teaching.9
2. Id.
3. Matthew W. Finkin & Robert C. Post, For the Common Good 81 (Yale University Press, 
New Haven, Conn. 2009). 
4. Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, ABA, Standards and Rules of 
Procedure for Approval of Law Schools, Std. 302(b)(1) (2007) [hereinafter ABA Standards].
5. Association of American Law Schools, AALS Directory of Law Teachers 1218–27 (2007).
6. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, Political Interference in Law School Clinical Programs: 
Reflections on Outside Interference and Academic Freedom, 11 J.C. & U.L. 179, 185–86 
(1984) (describing an effort in Colorado to prevent a law professor from handling civil rights 
cases in a constitutional litigation seminar).
7. See Michael A. Millemann & Steven D. Schwinn, Teaching Legal Research and Writing 
With Actual Legal Work: Extending Clinical Education Into the First Year, 12 Clinical L. 
Rev. 441, 446–47 & n.106 (2006) (discussing legal writing courses doing work to be used in 
the client’s legal representation).
8. John B. Mitchell et al., And Then Suddenly Seattle University Was on Its Way to a Parallel, 
Integrative Curriculum, 2 Clinical L. Rev. 1, 2 & n.4 (1995) (identifying six substantive 
courses with one-credit live client components).
9. See Robert R. Kuehn & Peter A. Joy, An Ethics Critique of Interference in Law School 
Clinics, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 1971, 1976–92 (2003) (chronicling interference in law clinic case 
and client selection).
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Scholarship on interference in clinical programs has focused primarily 
on the impropriety of interference with the institutional autonomy of law 
schools by those outside the university, such as politicians or business interests 
attempting to pressure universities and law schools not to represent or to 
abandon the representation of some clients.10 Conversely, internal intrusions 
on law clinic lawyering, usually by university or law school administrators 
seeking to influence whether and how clinical faculty and students represent 
some clients, have not been well-publicized. Consequently, there is virtually 
no scholarly attention to the tension between the individual lawyer-professor’s 
academic freedom and professional responsibility to clients and the law 
school’s decision-making authority.
We are motivated to write this article because of some of the more egregious 
instances of interference with lawyering in the academy. The earliest reported 
instance is the firing of two clinical faculty members for their involvement in 
a civil rights case.11 More recently, university administrators, responding to 
complaints from state legislators, local business leaders and others, sought to 
pressure an environmental clinic director to avoid taking on certain potentially 
controversial cases, slashed the clinic’s available funding, and threatened to 
separate the clinic from the law school.12 In another instance, a law school dean 
and associate dean, without first discussing the matter with the clinic director, 
notified a clinic client that the law school was withdrawing representation in a 
high profile human-rights case.13 In still another instance, clinical program co-
directors instructed a clinical faculty member not to follow the client’s request 
to seek attorney fees in a successful housing discrimination case after opposing 
counsel, two alumni of the law school, complained to the dean.14 In these 
10. Some examples of outside interference are criticisms and attempted reprisals against the 
environmental law clinics at the University of Oregon, University of Pittsburgh, and Tulane 
University. See id. at 1992–2030; Schneider, supra note 6, at 188–92.
11. In 1968, the dean of the University of Mississippi School of Law, at the direction of the 
chancellor but over the objections of the law faculty, fired the professors after their 
participation in a school desegregation lawsuit prompted complaints from some state 
legislators and university trustees. The two professors successfully challenged their treatment 
in federal court. Trister v. Univ. of Miss., 420 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1969). Facing possible 
expulsion from the Association of American Law Schools, the University later offered re-
employment to the clinical professors. Kuehn & Joy, supra note 9, at 1976–77; AAUP, The 
University of Mississippi, AAUP Bulletin, Spring 1970, at 75, 84–85.
12. Kuehn & Joy, supra note 9, at 1986–88 (reporting events at the University of Pittsburgh). A 
faculty senate committee found that the administrators’ actions infringed on principles of 
academic freedom. University of Pittsburgh Senate, Report of the Tenure and Academic 
Freedom Committee on the Environmental Law Clinic (Jan. 28, 2002) (on file with authors).
13. Kuehn & Joy, supra note 9, at 1988–89 (reporting on events involving the International 
Human Rights Clinic at St. Mary’s University School of Law). In addition to forcing the 
clinic to withdraw from the case, the associate dean entered the clinic file room and reviewed 
case files without permission from the clinic director or client. Id. at 1989.
14. Letter from Amy F. Robertson, Attorney for Doug Smith, to Paul Chan, University of 
Denver Counsel (Nov. 12, 2002) (on file with authors).
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instances, the interference with the faculty representation of clients as part of 
their teaching was not motivated by educational or professional responsibility 
concerns but, apparently, to mollify critics of the faculty member.
Because of the potential for internal influence on their teaching, law faculty 
teaching real-life experiential learning courses often experience a tension in 
carrying out their educational mission that classroom faculty do not. A 2005 
survey of law clinic teachers found that one-third “worried” about the reaction 
of the law faculty or administration to their clinic casework.15 Seventeen 
percent of clinic faculty reported making changes in their case selection 
choices because of those worries, and more than ten percent reported making 
significant or major changes.16
In a more recent survey of clinical faculty, fifteen percent of clinical 
teachers reported that the clinical program director had suggested they avoid 
a particular case.17 Nine percent of teachers stated that their law school dean 
had made the same suggestion, and seven percent responded that on their 
own initiative they had avoided a case because they suspected the dean would 
prefer they did so.18
Against this backdrop, this article considers how the practice of law in the 
legal academy is both similar to and different from the typical practice of law in 
a firm or public interest organization and the teaching that law faculty do in the 
classroom. We focus in particular on how notions of academic freedom apply to 
professors lawyering in the academy and how the professional responsibilities 
of attorney-professors influence their teaching pursuits and relationships with 
the dean, other faculty members, and the university administration.
Our inquiry focuses on two underlying questions. First, how much 
discretion should individual faculty have in selecting cases for their courses? 
Second, once a faculty member undertakes to represent a client within a course, 
should a dean, clinical program director, or other person not involved in the 
client’s representation be able to direct the faculty member’s decisions on how 
to handle the matter? In the process of addressing these issues, we suggest an 
approach that seeks to be true to the professional rights and responsibilities of 
law faculty both as academics and attorneys.
We have chosen not to address two related but distinct academic freedom 
issues. First, the Supreme Court has not clearly defined the First Amendment 
15. Bridget McCormack, Academic Freedom for Clinical Law Faculty (Jan. 6, 2006) 
(unpublished survey results, on file with authors). Surveys were sent by e-mail to clinical 
faculty members at every AALS-member school. Of the approximately 300 clinicians 
surveyed, 147 responded.
16. Id.
17. Bridget McCormack, Academic Freedom in Clinical Teaching (June 4, 2008) (unpublished 
survey results, on file with authors). An invitation to respond to an on-line survey was sent 
by e-mail to clinical faculty at every AALS-member school. Of the 334 clinicians invited to 
respond, 251 completed the survey.
18. Id.
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contours of academic freedom and commentators disagree about its scope, 
especially in internal disputes between a professor and the university.19 For 
that reason, we do not address it here. Second, because we focus on the 
practice of law within the law school’s educational mission, we also do not 
address lawyering by faculty as pro bono or outside paid work for which the 
law school does not assume oversight, although the school may retain a veto 
right where the professor’s outside legal work might conflict with the interests 
of the university.20 Instead, our focus is on academic freedom as a professional 
norm and instrumental right promoting legal education as expressed by the 
American Association of University Professors (AAUP) and recognized and 
protected by the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) and the ABA.21
19. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006) (holding that the First Amendment only 
protects a public employee’s speech when the employee speaks as a citizen but leaving 
for another day “whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner 
to a case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching”). Peter Byrne argues that 
the First Amendment gives university administrators “extensive control over curricular 
judgments so long as they do not penalize a professor solely for his political views.” J. 
Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A Special Concern of the First Amendment, 99 Yale L.J. 
251, 301–02 (1989). David Rabban, however, argues that the Supreme Court’s recognition 
of institutional academic freedom “does not support the conclusion that the Court has 
rejected a constitutional right of individual professors to academic freedom against trustees, 
administrators, and faculty peers.” David M. Rabban, Functional Analysis of “Individual” 
and “Institutional” Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 227, 280 (Summer 1990). Michael Olivas characterizes the constitutional contours 
of academic freedom as paradoxical: “It protects quite expansively the scholarly enterprise 
from outside interference (grand juries, witch-hunting officials, funding agencies, and other 
assorted patrons, critics, and ‘do-gooders’), but only grants limited protection to professors’ 
intramural speech or classroom activities against institutional interests.” Michael A. Olivas, 
Reflections on Professorial Academic Freedom: Second Thoughts on the Third “Essential 
Freedom,” 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1835, 1837 (1993).
20. For a discussion of the ethical considerations involved in professors practicing outside the 
law school, see Michael H. Hoeflich & J. Nick Badgerow, Law School Faculty, LLP: Law 
Professors as a Law Firm, 53 U. Kan. L. Rev. 853 (2005). For a discussion of the ethical 
issues involved when a classroom professor helps with a law clinic case, see Laura L. Rovner, 
The Unforeseen Ethical Ramifications of Classroom Faculty Participation in Law School 
Clinics, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1113 (2007).
21. As noted previously in the text, our discussion focuses on the generally shared understanding 
of the custom and usage of academic freedom, especially among law faculty, and not upon 
academic freedom as a First Amendment right. Matthew Finkin has observed that the 
AAUP’s 1940 Statement represents a “professional common or customary law of academic 
freedom and tenure.” Matthew W. Finkin, Towards a Law of Academic Status, 22 Buff. 
L. Rev. 575, 577 (1972). Several courts have recognized that the customs and practices at a 
university or among the academic community as a whole are important to understanding 
the rights of individual faculty. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972) (noting 
that the “unwritten ‘common law’ in a particular university” may create a right to tenure 
even if an explicit tenure system does not exist); Browzin v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 527 
F.2d 843, 848 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (finding that the statements of the AAUP, such as the 
1940 Statement, and other statements of higher education organizations “represent widely 
shared norms within the academic community” and may be used in interpreting faculty 
contracts); Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (reasoning that 
faculty “[c]ontracts are written, and are to be read, by reference to the norms of conduct and 
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Background on the Law Professor as Lawyer
When a dean, the law faculty, or the university administration seeks to 
influence a professor acting as a lawyer in a law school course, a common 
response is to say that the professor enjoys the same academic freedom as 
other members of the legal academy. Some have compared a professor’s 
decisions about which legal matters to undertake to a classroom teacher’s 
choice of textbooks, and the professor’s decisions on handling cases similar 
to a classroom teacher’s decisions about what to teach in class.22 But not all 
underlying issues are comparable, and the shield of academic freedom may 
not be so obvious or impenetrable. Decisions about which matter to undertake 
or strategy to pursue may affect not only student learning and the client’s 
interests but also the interests of the university and, in public universities, the 
state.
Additionally, professors practicing law within the academy often argue that 
their professional responsibility obligation to exercise independent judgment 
in client representation should shield them from attempts to influence or 
interfere with their work.23 But it’s not that simple. In the typical law firm, 
senior partners direct the actions of subordinate attorneys, and lawyers in legal 
services offices report to supervising attorneys as well as non-lawyer directors, 
oversight boards, and even Congress. Also, most professional responsibility 
rules only apply once an attorney has commenced the attorney-client 
relationship, not at the earlier stage of considering whether to undertake the 
representation. Therefore, in some instances, telling a dean, clinical program 
director, faculty, or university president that it is unethical to question a lawyer-
professor’s professional decisions may overstate ethical norms in a particular 
situation.
expectations founded upon them.”).
22. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 6, at 190 (“Selection of individual cases to handle and methods 
of handling those cases, like the selection of casebooks and classroom teaching approaches, 
lies at the very heart of the educational function of clinical programs. So long as the decisions 
made by a clinical teacher reasonably serve that educational function, a judgment that only 
the law school faculty is capable of making, these decisions should be protected by academic 
freedom.”). Although many of the examples we cite involve litigation, the academic freedom 
principles and ethical concerns are applicable to courses engaged in non-litigation work for 
clients.
23. Id. at 191–92. For the purpose of our analysis, we accept the current state of ethics rules and 
do not recommend different standards for faculty lawyering in the academy for two reasons. 
First and foremost, we believe that the practice of law as part of a course should model the 
ethical norms the student will likely face upon graduation. This approach places the student 
in the role as a practicing lawyer and better prepares the student for practice. Second, 
faculty lawyering in the academy have the same underlying fiduciary obligations to their 
clients as other lawyers, and it is beyond the scope of this article to analyze whether there 
are substantial policy reasons that would justify different ethical standards for lawyering 
in the academy. Instead, we prefer to accept the existing ethical rules in order to suggest 
a workable approach for addressing the academic freedom and professional responsibility 
issues for faculty lawyering in the academy.
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Interference with law practice in the academy typically occurs after client 
representation has begun, through efforts to control or veto individual faculty 
decisions over which matters to undertake or which strategies to employ. 
Before turning to some concrete examples, we will briefly analyze the relevant 
norms of academic freedom and professional responsibility.
Academic Freedom and the Practice of Law
The AAUP, AALS, and ABA each promote academic freedom principles 
in law school teaching. The AAUP separates academic freedom into three 
elements: freedom of inquiry and research; freedom of teaching, including 
both what may be taught and how it shall be taught; and freedom of extramural 
utterance or action.24 The AAUP notes that academic freedom in teaching is 
“fundamental for the protection of the rights of the teacher in teaching and of 
the student to freedom in learning.”25 Through its bylaws, the AALS and its 
member law schools have adopted the AAUP academic freedom principles,26 
and stated that law professors must enjoy the benefit of academic freedom to 
pursue their teaching obligations effectively.27 The ABA endorses these same 
AAUP academic freedom principles in its law school accreditation standards.28
One justification for respecting academic freedom and deferring to the 
professional judgment of an individual faculty member is that the professor 
is the expert on a particular subject. Deference is also necessary to nourish an 
environment of discovery and intellectual experimentation and prevent what 
the Supreme Court, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, called the “pall of orthodoxy 
over the classroom.”29 Giving the professor the ultimate choice about what 
and how to teach when the course’s influence reaches beyond the classroom 
also promotes the university’s neutrality by allowing the school to disavow 
responsibility for controversial materials or methods and avoid taking sides in 
a dispute.30
24. See 1940 Statement, reprinted in Redbook, supra note 1, at 3. Justice Frankfurter described the 
four essential freedoms of a university as “to determine for itself on academic grounds who 
may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.” 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
25. 1940 Statement, reprinted in Redbook, supra note 1, at 3.
26. “A faculty member shall have academic freedom and tenure in accordance with the principles 
of the American Association of University Professors.” AALS, Bylaws § 6-6(d), available at 
http://www.aals.org/about_handbook_bylaws.php; see also AALS, Exec. Comm. Regs. 4.3, 
available at http://www.aals.org/about_handbook_regulations.php. 
27. AALS, Statement of the Association of American Law Schools in Support of Academic 
Freedom of Clinical Faculty (Jan. 3, 2001) (on file with authors). The AALS has identified 
academic freedom as one of its core values and expects its member schools to value 
academic freedom. AALS, Bylaws § 6-1(a) & (b)(ii), available at http://www.aals.org/
about_handbook_bylaws.php.
28. ABA Standards, supra note 4, at Std. 405(b) & App. 1.
29. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
30. See Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom 
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AALS regulations explicitly state that academic freedom applies to all 
engaged in teaching, including in a clinical program, without regard to 
whether the professor is eligible for tenure.31 In response to attacks on clinics 
from outside the legal academy, the AALS Executive Committee stated in 
2001: “The Association reaffirms that academic freedom is critical to achieving 
the objectives of clinical legal education and that the principle of academic 
freedom applies equally to clinical law faculty.”32
The AALS has been vigilant in defending law clinics and professors against 
“external” threats to academic freedom from politicians, alumni, university 
donors, and corporate interests.33 However, apart from its opposition to the 
University of Mississippi School of Law’s attempt to sanction two clinical 
professors in the late 1960s for their involvement in a school desegregation 
lawsuit,34 the AALS has not offered guidance on how to resolve a conflict 
between an individual professor and the dean, faculty, or clinical program 
director over case decisions. The ABA too has focused its attention on repelling 
attacks from persons or institutions outside law schools and has not provided 
guidance on resolving disputes over interference within law schools.35
This silence may be due to the confidential nature of AALS and ABA 
proceedings designed to protect academic freedom.36 Except for the firing of 
clinical faculty at the University of Mississippi, no other publicized instance 
of internal interference with faculty representation of clients has come before 
either the AALS or the ABA.
The AAUP has stated that “[t]he faculty has primary responsibility for such 
fundamental areas as curriculum, subject matter and methods of instruction.”37 
in America, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 1265, 1281 (1988).
31. AALS, Exec. Comm. Regs. 4.2.
32. AALS, supra note 27.
33. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Association of American Law Schools, Wishnatsky v. 
Rovner, 433 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2006) (supporting the right of the clinical faculty at the 
University of North Dakota to retain full decision-making authority over the selection of 
cases consistent with their academic freedom and professional responsibility rights and 
responsibilities); Brief for Amici Curiae, the Association of American Law Schools et al., 
S. Christian Leadership Conference v. Supreme Court of the State of La., 252 F.3d 781 (5th 
Cir. 2001) (arguing against a restrictive student practice rule that denied law clinic students 
the ability to represent certain controversial clients because “[f]aculty have the right to 
determine what may be taught and how it may be taught, whether in a law school clinic or a 
traditional classroom”).
34. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
35. See Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, ABA, Interference in Law School 
Clinical Activities (June 1997).
36. See AALS, Exec. Comm. Regs. 4.5; ABA Standards, supra note 4, at Rules of Procedure 24 & 
25.
37. AAUP, Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities (1966) (jointly formulated 
by the AAUP, American Council of Education, and Association of Governing Boards of 
Universities and Colleges), reprinted in Redbook, supra note 1, at 135.
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This statement reflects the faculty’s role as a collective body and reinforces its 
role in determining the academic content of a program of study. More recently, 
the AAUP stated:
[I]n many institutions the contents of courses are subject to collegial and 
institutional oversight and control; even the text of course descriptions may 
be subject to approval. Curriculum committees typically supervise course 
offerings to ensure their fit with programmatic goals and their compatibility 
with larger educational ends (like course sequencing). Although instructors 
are ethically obligated to follow approved curricular guidelines, “freedom in 
the classroom” affords instructors wide latitude to decide how to approach a 
subject, how best to present and explore the material, and so forth.38
Another AAUP policy statement further explains:
[S]ince the faculty has primary responsibility for the teaching and research 
done in the institution, the faculty’s voice on matters having to do with 
teaching and research should be given the greatest weight….Since such 
decisions as those involving choice of method of instruction, subject matter 
to be taught…bear directly on the teaching and research conducted in the 
institution, the faculty should have primary authority over decisions about 
such matters—that is, the administration should “concur with the faculty 
judgment except in rare instances and for compelling reasons which should 
be stated in detail.”39
These AAUP statements clarify the contours of academic freedom as 
a professional norm and recognize the role of the faculty and curriculum 
committees, but they do not extend the same oversight and control of teaching 
matters to law school deans or other university officials. In medical schools, 
the AAUP defends the ability of professors to select materials and determine 
the approach to the subject “without having their decisions subject to the veto 
of a department chair, dean, or other administrative officer.”40 This statement 
seems equally applicable to law schools—while the faculty as a whole may 
have a legitimate role to determine policies affecting some aspects of what 
professors may do as lawyers in the academy, a law school dean or university 
administrator acting alone rarely would.
Although they may not be perfect analogies, clinical professors and others 
have argued that courtrooms, administrative hearings, and other practice 
settings are the classrooms and that cases are the teaching materials. A law 
professor would be free to choose a certain textbook, provided it addressed the 
relevant subject area and was not so outdated as to be detrimental to student 
38. Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, AAUP, Freedom in the Classroom (2007).
39. AAUP, On the Relationship of Faculty Governance to Academic Freedom (1994) (quoting 
AAUP, Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities), reprinted in Redbook, supra 
note 1, at 141.
40. AAUP, Academic Freedom in the Medical School (1999), reprinted in Redbook, supra note 1, 
at 125.
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learning. By analogy, the same academic freedom norm that favors the rights 
of an individual professor in textbook selection supports a professor lawyering 
in the academy in the selection of individual cases and other legal matters for 
teaching purposes.41
In this way, a law professor in a clinic or other course with a real-life 
experiential component is analogous to a professor who teaches real-life 
experiential courses in medical, social work, architecture, and other schools 
and university departments. In every instance, the professor has the academic 
freedom to structure the experience, such as by choosing the patients, clients, 
or projects that will best foster the student’s learning, provided the choices are 
consistent with the subject matter and professional skills being taught.
However, academic freedom is not absolute. Not only must the professor 
refrain from introducing controversial material unrelated to the subject being 
taught,42 but a dean or department head usually decides which courses the 
faculty member will teach, in the process dictating the general subject matter 
the faculty member may pursue in the classroom. In addition, faculties 
usually approve new courses, and that approval generally involves review of a 
proposed coursebook and syllabus. Although that approval may occur long 
before a professor makes her choice about materials and assignments, the 
approval process underscores the fact that the individual faculty member does 
not have unfettered freedom to teach whatever she desires.
The ABA has recognized these limitations, stating that the dean and faculty 
shall formulate and administer the educational program of the law school, 
including curriculum and instructional methods.43 As previously discussed, 
the AAUP also recognizes the faculty’s collective responsibility in this regard.44 
Michael Olivas explains that although professors have wide ranging discretion 
to formulate teaching methods, “this autonomy is, within broad limits, highly 
contingent upon traditional norms of peer review, codes of ethical behavior, 
and institutional standards.”45
41. See note 22 and accompanying text; see also Submission of the Association of American Law 
Schools to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana Concerning the Review of the 
Supreme Court’s Student Practice Rule, 4 Clinical L. Rev. 539, 557 (1998); James J. Fishman, 
Tenure: Endangered or Evolutionary Species, 38 Akron L. Rev. 771, 786 (2005).
42. The AAUP’s admonition to avoid unrelated controversial matter is not intended “to 
discourage what is ‘controversial.’ Controversy is at the heart of the free academic inquiry 
which the entire statement is designed to foster. The passage serves to underscore the need 
for teachers to avoid persistently intruding material which has no relation to their subject.” 
1940 Statement, reprinted in Redbook, supra note 1, at 3.
43. ABA Standards, supra note 4, at Std. 205(b).
44. AAUP, supra note 39.
45. Olivas, supra note 19, at 1856; see also David M. Rabban, Does Academic Freedom Limit 
Faculty Autonomy? 66 Tex. L. Rev. 1405, 1409–12 (1988) (explaining that the AAUP’s 
conception of academic freedom limits the autonomy of professors by requiring adherence to 
professional norms but that administrators and governing boards should overturn decisions 
of faculty bodies only where there is improper application of professional standards).
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Within law schools, faculties and curriculum committees sometimes dictate 
which book or syllabus all teachers of a certain subject will use. For example, 
program directors or a faculty committee may determine the materials used in 
some first-year law school courses, particularly legal writing courses. Faculty 
members teaching those subjects are expected to comply. However, efforts to 
impose such conformity on law faculty generally, or, some would argue, upon 
faculty with more status than those usually teaching legal writing,46 would 
likely be met with considerable objection unless there was a valid educational 
reason for such conformity and those faculty agreed to coordinate their 
selection of teaching materials.47
Complicating the analogies between legal matters and textbooks and 
lawyering courses and classrooms is the impact cases and other legal matters 
may have beyond the students in the classroom. Some cases may create 
difficulties, politically and economically, for the university, law school, or 
other law faculty. Courses in which professors act as lawyers not only help 
law students learn, they also influence the behavior of nonstudents and other 
institutions. But does that impact allow the dean or faculty more leeway under 
academic freedom principles to control what (the legal matters selected) or 
how something (the representational strategy) is taught in the law school 
course?
Unfortunately, there appears to be little guidance on how academic freedom 
applies when teaching outside the traditional classroom. We have not found 
any discussion of how the principles of academic freedom apply to the clinical 
experience in medical or other professional schools or in undergraduate 
experiential or service-learning courses. But as a recent special ABA committee 
noted, nothing in AAUP statements on academic freedom “says or implies that 
it might be permissible to discriminate among fields of study by allocating 
more academic freedom to some and less to others.”48 In addition, the AAUP’s 
staff counsel has argued that “[clinical faculty], too, need academic freedom to 
make decisions about how best to educate students…. If academic freedom is 
46. Many commentators note that legal writing faculty, who are usually women, generally have 
less status, and thus fewer rights, than other law faculty. See, e.g., JoAnne Duranko, Second 
Class Citizens in the Pink Ghetto, 50 J. Legal Educ. 562 (2000).
47. In selecting textbooks, law professors appear to enjoy more academic freedom than some 
other university professors. For example, it is not uncommon for undergraduate university 
departments, through committees or some other mechanisms, to select a single textbook for 
foundational or entry-level courses taught by several different faculty members. Telephone 
Interview with Michael A. Olivas, Professor, University of Houston Law Center and former 
General Counsel, AAUP, in Santa Fe, N.M. (Aug. 1, 2008). Nonetheless, the selection is 
based upon educational considerations. Id.; see also AAUP, supra note 40 (noting that where 
teaching duties are shared among faculty members and require coordination and structure, 
the decisions of the group on course content, syllabi, and examination may prevail over the 
dissenting position of a particular individual).
48. ABA, Report of Special Committee on Security of Position (May 2008).
Lawyering in the Academy
108 Journal of Legal Education
intended to protect the learning process and the search for truth, it cannot be 
a privilege enjoyed solely for faculty and students in traditional classrooms.”49
It is also important to note that law schools, as professional schools, have 
an obligation to train students to be effective attorneys and that the ABA has 
acknowledged that some legal skills may be best learned in the context of 
actual litigation or other practice settings.50 If recent calls for legal education 
reform are heeded, this will likely become more of an issue as law schools 
provide additional opportunities to learn legal skills in the context of real-
life experiences.51 Moreover, both the ABA and AALS stress the need for law 
schools to advance the legal profession’s responsibility to ensure that legal 
assistance is available to those who cannot afford the services of the private 
bar.52 The AALS further highlights the responsibility of professors, and hence 
the legal academy, to “assist students to recognize the responsibility of lawyers 
to advance individual and social justice.”53
Given the growing consensus of opinion that more experiential learning 
opportunities are needed and that law schools have the obligation to advance 
access to justice for those unable to secure private counsel, the legal academy 
should embrace academic freedom norms broad enough to recognize and 
defend the decisions that professors make in pursuing those experiences 
for students. At the same time, academic freedom should not be so broadly 
construed to permit the professor to disregard established educational 
guidelines for the types of cases appropriate for a particular course.
49. Jonathan R. Alger, Legal Watch: Academic Freedom in the “Real World,” Academe, Mar.–
Apr. 2000, at 119.
50. ABA Standards, supra note 4, at Std. 302(b)(1). 
51. Both the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching and the Best Practices 
Project have called for greater integration of legal theory and experiential learning. William 
M. Sullivan et al., Educating Lawyers (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 2007); Roy Stuckey et 
al., Best Practices for Legal Education (Clinical Legal Education Assn., New York, 2007).
52. ABA Standards, supra note 4, at Std. 302(b)(2); AALS, Statement of Good Practices by Law 
Professors in the Discharge of Their Ethical and Professional Responsibilities (2003).
53. AALS, supra note 52. We do not suggest that a university or law school may not choose 
the appropriate focus for a clinic for strategic reasons, for example a clinic to represent 
children. A particular subject matter focus may assist a school with fundraising, generate 
positive publicity, or differentiate the law school from competing schools. Indeed, some 
schools adopt particular clinic courses because there is grant support for that specific clinic. 
Although one may argue that such motivations have little to do with identifying the best 
teaching cases or assessing the best way to provide needed legal services to underserved 
communities, these strategic motivations, for clinics and other aspects of the law school 
curriculum, are part of the accepted norms for law schools. Thus, we focus solely on the 
issues presented by intrusions into educational decisions of faculty in experiential courses 
that are at odds with academic freedom and professional responsibility norms.
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The Professional Responsibilities of a Practicing Professor
In addition to their academic role as professors, law teachers handling 
legal matters in their courses are lawyers. As such, they have professional 
responsibilities toward clients that other members of the legal academy do 
not. Also, like a lawyer in a law firm, the typical clinical professor usually 
has ethical duties and reporting obligations as a subordinate or supervising 
attorney.
When a dean, clinical program director, or law faculty seeks to influence a 
law professor’s case decisions, four primary ethical concerns arise: the roles and 
responsibilities of law school administrators; client confidentiality; conflicts of 
interest; and the allocation of authority between client and attorney.
Law School Administrators as Law Firm Managers
When analyzing lawyering in the academy, the roles and responsibilities of 
law school administrators, especially the clinical program director, in relation 
to the individual professor are important. To understand this relationship, it 
is necessary to define the law office within which the professor practices. If 
no one else is involved in the client representation and sufficient measures 
are taken to avoid inadvertently creating a program-wide law firm through 
shared office space, the law firm could be the individual law clinic or course 
the professor teaches.54 Where professors work together on cases or share office 
space and personnel, the entire clinic program may be defined as a law firm.
Whatever the size and composition of the firm, an ABA ethics opinion 
makes clear that no lawyer-client relationship exists between clinic clients and 
the governing body of a law clinic, defined as the law school dean, faculty, 
and university officials.55 Hence, as a general rule, school administrators not 
working in the clinic are not part of the law clinic firm, do not have an attorney-
client relationship with clinic clients, and are not entitled to confidential client 
information unless the client has consented to the disclosures.
Most schools portray their various law clinics to the public as parts of a 
single law school clinical program or law firm.56 In almost all cases, clients 
agree to be represented by “the law clinic,” not solely by an individual faculty 
member.57 Whenever a clinical program operates as a law firm, the clinical 
54. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.0(c) & cmt. [2] [hereinafter Model Rules]; Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 123(3) & cmt. e [hereinafter Restatement].
 “[H]ow the clinical program is structured and held out to the public will determine whether 
or not for conflicts purposes each individual clinic will be considered a separate law firm or 
all of the clinics in the entire clinical program will be treated as one law firm.” Peter A. Joy 
& Robert R. Kuehn, Conflict of Interest and Competency Issues in Law Clinic Practice, 9 
Clinical L. Rev. 493, 529 (2002); see also Rovner, supra note 20, at 1122–25.
55. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1208 (1972).
56. Joy & Kuehn, supra note 54, at 530.
57. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1428 (1979) (stating that 
“absent a special agreement, the client employs the legal services office as a firm and not a 
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program director takes on managerial authority over the work of the clinic and 
may also have direct supervisory authority over some or all of the other faculty 
lawyering in the clinic law office. Prevailing ethics rules define the rights and 
responsibilities of the clinic director in relation to the other clinical faculty.58
These same rules designate other clinical faculty as “subordinate” lawyers.59 
By operating within a law firm and not as sole practitioners, clinic professors 
may have to yield some professional autonomy to the firm’s supervising 
attorney—the clinic director—just as lawyers in a firm or a legal services office 
do.60 As the ABA explained in the context of a legal services office:
Staff lawyers of a legal services office are subject to the direction of and control 
of senior lawyers, the chief lawyer, or the executive director (if a lawyer), as the 
case may be, just as associates in any law firm are subject to the direction and 
control of their seniors. Such internal communication and control is not only 
permissible but salutary. It is only control of the staff lawyer’s judgment by an 
external source that is improper.61
As the managing attorney, the clinical program director assumes some 
responsibility for the actions of other clinic lawyers when the clinical program 
operates as a single law firm. Professional responsibility rules require attorneys 
with managerial authority to establish internal policies and procedures to 
provide reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to ethics 
rules.62 As a managing lawyer, the program director may be responsible if 
the director has knowledge of another clinic lawyer’s violation of rules of 
professional conduct.63 Clinical program directors have similar obligations 
toward the actions of nonlawyers, including law students and staff.64 Therefore, 
where a clinical program director assumes authority comparable to that of 
a partner in a law firm, that director is at least indirectly responsible for all 
the work done in the law clinic and generally would be expected to prohibit 
particular lawyer”); accord ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 334 
(1974).
58. Model Rules, supra note 54, at R. 5.1. Ethics rules note the distinction between a lawyer 
with managerial authority and one who may have supervisory authority. A lawyer with 
“managerial authority over the professional work of a firm” may be a partner or may be a 
lawyer “having comparable authority in a legal services organization or a law department 
of an enterprise or government agency.” Id. at R. 5.1 cmt. 1. A lawyer also may have direct 
supervisory authority over the work of another lawyer that is distinct from the managerial 
authority. Id. at R. 5.1(b).
59.  Id., at R. 5.2.
60. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 334 (1974); ABA Comm. 
on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1428 (1979).
61. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1208 (1972).
62. Model Rules, supra note 54, at R. 5.1(a), (b); Restatement, supra note 54, at § 11(1), (2).
63. Model Rules, supra note 54, at R. 5.1(c); Restatement, supra note 54, at § 11(3).
64. See Model Rules, supra note 54, at R. 5.3; Restatement, supra note 54, at § 11(4).
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actions by a subordinate clinic attorney or students that would violate rules of 
professional conduct.
In addition, the clinical program director may have direct supervisory 
authority over another faculty member lawyering in the clinic firm, for 
example in a clinic that is co-taught by the clinic director and other faculty or 
in a clinic organized so that the clinical program director has some lawyering 
involvement in all cases. Indeed, a clinic may be organized in such a way that 
some faculty other than the clinical program director have direct supervisory 
authority over other clinic lawyers. This may occur when a clinic uses lawyers 
who are clinical fellows or when newer clinical faculty are paired with more 
experienced clinical faculty.
Thus, in considering the propriety of internal influences on a professor’s 
judgment as a lawyer, some ethics rules recognize that, as a lawyer operating 
within the clinic law firm, the professor is subject to the authority of the 
clinical program director in the director’s managerial role and subject to the 
program director or any other lawyer who has a direct supervisory role over 
the professor’s lawyering. Only when the professor is the sole instructor in a 
clinic or other course with a real-life experiential component and not as part 
of a “firm” within the law school would the professor essentially be acting as 
a sole practitioner.
The law school’s hierarchy also may be a complicating factor in resolving 
issues of professional responsibility. A clinical program director who holds a 
faculty rank equal to or less than another faculty member in the program may 
encounter difficulty in presuming to supervise the professional judgments of 
other faculty. Many program directors are treated as a “first among equals” 
and given only administrative responsibilities over others in the program. 
Additionally, junior faculty on tenure track or long-term contracts may be 
particularly sensitive to the opinions of senior colleagues, and faculty on short-
term or at-will contracts may feel that vulnerability even more keenly.
Client Confidentiality
Unless sharing the information with a dean or other official outside the 
course advances the client’s interests, the professor-attorney must protect 
confidential client information.65 While this principle may not prevent outside 
influences on clinic decisions, it at least means that, in the absence of client 
consent, professors may only provide outsiders limited information about 
65. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-393 (1995) (holding that a 
lawyer employed in a government office may disclose to a nonlawyer supervisor information 
relating to the representation of a client only if such disclosure would help carry out the 
client’s representation, unless the client consented to the disclosure after consultation or 
the information was disclosed in a way that does not compromise client confidentiality); 
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 334 (1974) (reiterating that 
any information sought by a board of directors of a legal services office must be reasonably 
required for a legitimate purpose and not used to restrict the office’s activities); see also Model 
Rules, supra note 54, at R. 1.6 cmt. 5; Restatement, supra note 54, at § 60 cmt. f.
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their cases. Therefore, when a university official or law school dean seeks to 
influence a faculty member’s representation of a client, they may be acting on 
incomplete information.
The confidentiality responsibilities of the clinical program director may be 
much different. If the program is organized as a joint law office in which all 
client information is presumed to be shared, then the director is privy to client 
confidences just as are lawyers in a private law firm.66
If the clinical program is organized as distinct law offices for each particular 
clinical course, then the program director may not have any more access to 
confidential client information than any other faculty member not teaching in 
the particular clinic. To attain that status, each clinical course would have to 
be “held out to the public as a separate law office entity with separate support 
staff, separate filing systems, separate computer systems, and other adequate 
measures to assure that confidential information from clients in one clinic will 
not be shared among the students and faculty in other clinics.”67 In such an 
arrangement, steps must also be taken to prevent the director of the clinical 
program from accessing confidential information about clients not in her 
particular clinic.
Conflicts of Interest
Attempts to influence case decisions of faculty lawyering in the academy 
also may present conflict of interest issues. A professor practicing law cannot 
permit a person who provides compensation or employment, be it a dean, 
university president or trustee, to interfere with, direct, or regulate that 
lawyer’s independent professional judgment or otherwise interfere with the 
client-lawyer relationship.68 The lawyer’s obligation to a client is not modified 
by a third-party’s employment of the lawyer.
One way clinical programs may avoid potential conflicts of interest between 
a client and a law professor’s obligations to the law school or university is by 
implementing policies that prohibit representing clients in disputes with the 
university or law school.69 Many law school clinics have such policies.70
Another area for potential conflicts arises when a professor represents a 
client in a controversy with a member of the governing body of or a major 
donor to the university or law school. To represent a client in such a matter, 
the faculty member must reasonably believe that her professional judgment 
would not be adversely affected by her personal interests—that the donor 
does not have control or influence over the faculty member’s salary, contract 
66. Model Rules, supra note 54, at R. 1.10 cmt. [2], 1.9 cmt. [6]; Restatement, supra note 54, at § 
123 cmt. b.
67. Joy & Kuehn, supra note 54, at 529–30.
68. Model Rules, supra note 54, at R. 1.8(f)(2), 5.4(c); Restatement, supra note 54, at § 134.
69. Joy & Kuehn, supra note 54, at 551.
70. Id. at nn.217–18 and accompanying text.
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renewal, or tenure. In such situations, conflict of interest rules do not prohibit 
representation, so long as there is full disclosure and client consent.71
Still, in some instances, it may be unreasonable for a faculty member to 
believe that her professional judgment may not be impaired by litigating 
against a member of the university or law school governing body or influential 
donor. Such persons may have substantial influence with the university 
president or law school dean, and those administrators do have authority over 
the faculty member’s terms and conditions of employment.
Additionally, junior faculty who do not have tenure or others without 
presumptively renewable long-term contracts may be particularly cautious 
about taking on any potentially controversial matter. They may feel conflicted 
between their professional responsibility to provide legal services to those 
otherwise unable to obtain counsel and their personal interest in avoiding 
controversies that may threaten their employment. No matter how mundane 
the legal matter, clinical faculty can become unwittingly embroiled in a 
controversial matter that threatens their job security if the opposing party, 
opposing counsel, or someone else interested in the matter believes that 
outside pressure will cause a university administrator or the law school dean 
to intervene. Whenever there is an attempt to influence how a faculty member 
represents a client, a potential conflict of interest is present.
Allocation of Authority Between Client and Attorney
The allocation of authority between the client and attorney may become an 
ethical issue particular to lawyering in the academy where a faculty member 
seeks to limit the scope of services to a client due to law school or university 
restrictions on client representation, such as a restriction on suing the state or 
seeking certain types of relief, like attorney’s fees. Ethics rules require a lawyer 
to abide by the client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation 
and consult with the client as to the means.72 If a client has a viable cause 
of action against a particular party, offering to represent the client on the 
condition that the professor would not sue certain defendants or only seek 
certain remedies against a particular party may waive important legal rights 
for the client.
To be sure, ethics rules permit some limitations on the scope of representation, 
but only if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client 
gives informed consent.73 To obtain that consent, the faculty member must 
advise the client how the limitation might negatively impact the client.74 Such 
limitations can be problematic when dealing with an indigent client unless the 
71. Id. at 552–55; N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 688 (1997).
72. Model Rules, supra note 54, at R. 1.2(a); Restatement, supra note 54, at § 21.
73. Model Rules, supra note 54, at R. 1.2(c) & cmts. 6–8; Restatement, supra note 54, at § 19.
74. Kuehn & Joy, supra note 9, at 2043–44.
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faculty member can identify alternative legal representation if the client does 
not consent.
Once representation has begun, ethical norms permit the lawyer-professor to 
withdraw from the representation only if there is a fundamental disagreement 
with the client, the representation may result in an unreasonable financial 
burden on the lawyer, or other good cause exists. To ethically conclude the 
representation, the attorney-client representation must be terminated in a 
way that protects a client’s interests, including notice to the client and an 
opportunity to obtain other counsel.75
An Academic Freedom and Professional Responsibility  
Framework for Lawyering in the Academy
With this overview of academic freedom principles and professional 
responsibility rules in mind, in this section we consider the three most prevalent 
types of internal influences on case or legal matter decisions: 1) university 
policies limiting case selection or means of representation; 2) administration 
control over individual case selection; and 3) intervention in ongoing cases 
and legal matters. These real-world examples highlight the need to consider 
the point in the attorney-client relationship at which the intervention occurs 
and the relationship between the person seeking to influence case decisions 
and the professor handling the matter.
Policies Limiting Case Selection or Means of Representation
The first type of internal influence occurs when university officials establish 
policies that limit client representation decisions. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
several states attempted to enact legislation or take other measures that would 
prohibit law professors at state law schools from bringing suits against the 
state or representing certain types of clients such as prisoners.76 In most 
instances, the measures failed or were temporary, but university officials at 
some schools have imposed restrictions on their law school clinics bringing 
actions against the state.77 These restrictions typically prohibit even cases that 
clearly fall within the mission and types of matters handled by the clinic and 
do not apply to lawsuits against other parties.
In addition to limitations on types of cases, the university or law school 
may limit how a lawyer-professor’s course may represent a client. For example, 
clinics at some state-funded schools have policies that forgo requests for 
75. Model Rules, supra note 54, at R. 1.16(b)–(d); Restatement, supra note 54, at §§ 32–33.
76. See Kuehn & Joy, supra note 9, at 1977–81 (discussing examples from Arkansas, Colorado, 
Idaho and Iowa).
77. For example, the University of Tennessee Board of Trustees adopted a policy that clinics 
cannot bring significant litigation against the state. Douglas A. Blaze, Déjà vu All Over 
Again: Reflections on Fifty Years of Clinical Education, 64 Tenn. L. Rev. 939, 960 & n.180 
(1997).
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attorney’s fees when a state entity is the opposing party.78 Policies also prohibit 
pursuing claims as a class action or engaging in legislative lobbying.79
These types of restrictions have been adopted prior to a client’s request for 
assistance, and in some instances prior to the opening of the law clinic. The 
motive usually is not related to the educational mission of the university or 
a concern about the allocation of scarce resources. Instead, the policies seek 
to protect certain parties or avoid potentially controversial cases in order to 
shield the university from criticism by politicians and possible threats to state 
funding.
There is no educationally sound justification for intruding on the decision-
making authority of the attorney-professor by imposing such restrictions. 
In addition, it has generally been university administrators, not the faculty 
governing body, that have adopted the restrictions. The AAUP has stated 
that on such fundamental areas as curriculum and instructional methods, 
the power of review lodged in the university governing board or president 
“should be exercised adversely only in exceptional circumstances and for 
reasons communicated to the faculty.”80 Thus, in our view, such efforts to 
avoid controversy or appease certain influential persons or groups infringe 
on both the faculty’s collective right to establish educational policies and 
undermine the academic freedom of the individual professor to choose the 
most appropriate and effective means to educate students.81
Nevertheless, we are not aware of any instance of a law school or university 
faculty directly challenging or resisting such restrictions. To date, it appears 
that faculties have acquiesced to university administrators who have established 
policies that control the subject matter and general content of clinic and other 
client representation classes, even where those policies may not advance the 
educational purposes of the institution.
As for professional responsibility considerations, ethical norms disfavor, 
but do not preclude, such prior restrictions. ABA ethics opinions have 
repeatedly noted that boards that oversee legal services offices are vested with 
the authority to choose the types of cases and clients that will be represented.82 
However, these opinions caution against establishing guidelines that prohibit 
acceptance of controversial clients or cases that align the legal services office 
78. See Kuehn & Joy, supra note 9, at 2036 & n.300.
79. For example, the University of Alabama School of Law has a policy that its clinics will not 
lobby on behalf of clients.
80. AAUP, supra note 39. 
81. Such restrictions also run contrary to the AALS’s exhortation that law professors, and 
likewise law schools, have an enhanced obligation to pursue justice and “should assist 
students to recognize the responsibility to advance individual and social justice.” AALS, 
supra note 52.
82. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 334 (1974); ABA Comm. on 
Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 343 (1977); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l 
Responsibility, Informal Op. 1252 (1979).
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against government agencies or officials.83 Rather, case intake policies should 
encourage, not restrict, acceptance of unpopular clients and cases, particularly 
where the clients may not otherwise be able to obtain legal assistance.
Although ethical precepts strongly urge lawyers not to preclude such cases, 
disciplinary rules do not prohibit such restrictions. Because these restrictions 
are imposed prior to the formation of the attorney-client relationship, it 
cannot be said that this is an instance where third-parties are interfering with 
the professional judgment of an attorney in the representation of a client.84 
Even a prior restriction on what an attorney-professor may do within a case 
may be permissible if the client gives informed consent and the limitation does 
not result in the attorney violating other ethical rules.85
Thus, while both academic freedom and professional responsibility norms 
argue against broad case restrictions, university officials have so far been able 
to adopt such prohibitions without challenges to their authority.
Control Over Individual Case Selection
A few law schools have adopted policies that vest pre-approval in school 
officials of certain types of law clinic cases that might bring the school into 
conflict with politicians, donors, or alumni. These policies usually require the 
faculty member to disclose to the dean information concerning the proposed 
case and obtain approval before commencing to represent the client.86
Decanal control over individual case selection is usually motivated by a 
desire to avoid bad publicity or outside attacks on the school. For example, a 
dean may block the efforts of a constitutional rights clinic or litigation seminar 
to represent individuals wishing to challenge a local government’s crèche for 
fear of backlash against the school. Unlike restrictions barring representation 
of certain categories of clients or suits against certain parties, the professor may 
initially evaluate whether the matter would be appropriate for representation 
rather than face a blanket prohibition against certain types of matters. This 
second type of restriction is potentially narrower than a blanket prohibition 
83. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 334 (1974); ABA Comm. on 
Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1208 (1972).
84. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1252 (1972) (explaining that 
provision prohibiting interference “is directed against interference with the exercise of the 
attorney’s independent professional judgment in those matters which they do undertake on 
behalf of a client”).
85. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 334 (1974); ABA Comm. on 
Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1252 (1979); Model Rules, supra note 54, at R. 
1.2(c); Restatement, supra note 54, at § 19.
86. See, e.g., Department of Clinical Legal Studies, University of South Carolina School of Law, 
Client Matter Selection Policy to Address Potential Conflicts with Institutional Interests 
(Nov. 2000) (on file with authors); Chris Saporita & Andrew Yoder, Practicing for the Earth: 
Training Law Students Through Environmental Law Clinics 12 (Bloomington, Ind., July 
18, 2002) (referring to a review process then in effect for cases by the environmental clinic at 
Washington University) (unpublished report, on file with authors).
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against certain types of cases, because the dean may agree to approve all of the 
matters. However, the case-by-case approval is also more expansive, because 
a dean may reject more matters than fixed case intake restrictions would have 
prohibited.
A dean who rejects such a potentially controversial case acts in the same 
manner as a dean who, by analogy, would seek to veto a professor’s lecture 
topic after the faculty has approved the general scope and syllabus of the 
course. One difference, however, in this analogy is that since client matters 
come in one-by-one during the semester, there is no prior opportunity for the 
faculty or dean to review and approve all of the cases at the start of the course. 
With respect to case-by-case review of matters by a dean or others outside 
of the clinic, a special committee of the AALS Section on Clinical Legal 
Education concluded:
The Committee believes strongly that case selection decisions should be 
based on articulated educational goals so as to minimize conflicts between 
the personal preferences of individual clinicians and educational objectives….
Once a clinic has articulated pedagogical goals, and made decisions about 
the types of cases that the clinic will accept based on those goals, the 
clinical faculty’s choices about educational objectives, case selection, and 
case handling should be protected as part of the clinical faculty’s academic 
freedom.87
Similarly, in arguing that external restrictions on the types of matters that 
clinics may handle would impinge on the academic freedom of law teachers, 
the AALS stated:
[I]t is clear that clinical teachers…have a First Amendment right to select 
cases as their course materials for their clinics….Law schools…have hired 
clinical teachers to teach law students lawyering skills and professional values 
through the representation of actual clients. Once these teachers have been 
hired for that purpose, they must have the right, like any other law professor, 
to choose the materials which in their opinion are best suited to performing 
their objective.88
Notwithstanding these statements, the potentially adverse impacts of clinic 
cases for the law school and university as a whole appear to have convinced 
some deans and faculties that case-by-case review of a professor’s professional 
judgment is justified. It is unclear to us how the deans and faculties who have 
adopted such policies have aligned their positions with the academy’s position 
on academic freedom. Perhaps the generally weaker status of clinicians in the 
legal academy explains why some faculties and deans impose such constraints. 
87. Report of the Committee on the Future of the In-House Clinic, 42 J. Legal Educ. 508, 554 
(1992).
88. Submission of the Association of American Law Schools to the Supreme Court of the State 
of Louisiana Concerning the Review of the Supreme Court’s Student Practice Rule, supra 
note 41, at 557–58.
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We have observed that in almost all instances of internal interference, the 
affected professor was untenured.
In response to a proposal to require a law clinic to obtain the dean’s or a 
faculty committee’s prior approval of clinic matters, the ABA’s Committee on 
Ethics and Professional Responsibility concluded that such limits likely impair 
the independent judgment of clinic lawyers and their loyalty to clients.89 The 
Committee reasoned that such case-by-case prior approval would “violate the 
professional ethics and responsibilities of the dean and of the lawyer-directors 
of the clinic.”90
Unquestionably, pre-approval requirements run counter to the ethical norm 
that representation should not be denied to clients whose cause is controversial, 
especially where law clinics may be the “last lawyer in town.”91 But professional 
responsibility rules are “directed against interference with the exercise of the 
attorney’s independent professional judgment in those matters which they do 
undertake on behalf of a client.”92 Hence, it is more accurate to say that such 
pre-approval is counter to the values and goals of the legal profession, but not 
an actionable ethics violation by the dean or faculty committee.
Intervention in Ongoing Cases and Legal Matters
Some law school officials have also attempted to override decisions by 
professors concerning ongoing legal matters. As discussed in the Introduction, 
some of the more troubling examples include notifying a client that the clinic 
was withdrawing from a human rights case without first discussing the matter 
with the clinic professor and instructing a clinic lawyer not to file a fee petition 
in a successful housing discrimination case where the opposing counsel were 
law school alumni.93
More commonly though, the intervention is indirect and even unintentional. 
There are likely few deans who have not been called by an alumnus, university 
donor, or government official about a law clinic case. If the dean asks the 
lawyer-professor for an explanation, or more pointedly for a justification, the 
inquiry can be perceived as pressure, particularly by junior faculty or those 
serving at the dean’s pleasure. As noted above, surveys demonstrate that a 
significant number of clinical faculty worry about reactions to their client 
representation.94
One could perhaps analogize the most severe intrusions into ongoing case 
representation to a dean interrupting a class and instructing the professor 
89. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1208 (1972).
90. Id.
91. See Model Rules, supra note 54, at R. 1.2(b) & cmt. 5.
92. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1252 (1972).
93. See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text. We are aware of additional examples of 
intervention in ongoing cases but those instances have not been publicized.
94. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
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to end or modify the discussion or lecture. When such drastic intervention 
has occurred in a case, to our knowledge there has never been a claim that 
the professor was failing to provide proper legal representation for clients 
or educational opportunities for students. Intervening officials have usually 
claimed that the faculty member violated a policy or pre-filing procedure, 
albeit unwritten and unannounced, which forfeited any claim of academic 
freedom to proceed as the professor so chose.
Such severe actions undermine the credibility of the teacher, prevent the 
students from completing their course project, and inhibit the professional 
judgment of the clinical teacher, all harms antithetical to academic freedom 
norms. It is hard to imagine how a law school or law professor could model, 
as the AALS’s best practices urge, the highest standards of ethics and 
professionalism for students when the school’s actions show such lack of 
respect for the professor’s academic freedom and professional responsibilities. 
Where there is a question or complaint about a case, it is appropriate for 
a dean to request a brief explanation of the situation, just as the dean would 
with a complaint involving a classroom course. But, absent a gross breach of 
teaching standards or improper action that exposes the school to malpractice 
or other liability, school officials should wait until after the case is resolved 
to discuss the matter in detail and develop, with the faculty, appropriate 
prospective policies. Similarly, given the respect in law schools for the 
professional judgment of faculty, a school official must in all instances consult 
the professor before taking any action that might adversely affect a course or 
client.
Professional responsibility rules clearly prohibit interference in an ongoing 
legal matter, stating repeatedly that those who employ a lawyer to render 
legal services to another cannot be permitted to direct or regulate the lawyer’s 
professional judgment.95 One justification for such intervention could be 
that the lawyer’s professional judgment was under the direction and control 
of the dean or clinical program director. As supervisors, those officials could 
assert that they are allowed in some circumstances to override the subordinate 
lawyer’s professional judgment. Under this view, the dean or clinical program 
would not be an unauthorized outsider interfering in the client’s case.
Yet the claim that decisions by a lawyer practicing in the academy are under 
the professional direction of a dean seems unfounded. To our knowledge, no 
dean claims to be the supervising lawyer with responsibility for making case-
by-case decisions about the handling of a professor-lawyer’s client matters in 
her school. If she did, then she must be appropriately licensed in that state, 
identified in malpractice insurance policies as such, and willing to assume the 
same ethics responsibilities as those borne by senior partners in law firms. 
Even if the dean did agree to assume such supervisory authority and duties, 
any action taken must comport with rules regarding the relationship between 
a supervising and subordinate lawyer and governing withdrawal from a case.
95. Model Rules, supra note 54, at R. 1.8(f)(2), 5.4(c).
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On the other hand, as we explained when the clinical program is structured 
as a single law office, there are instances where a clinical program director 
may rightly claim to be the supervisory attorney of the clinic and intervene 
where a clinic lawyer acted contrary to ethics rules or clinic office policies. The 
ABA ethics committee has stated that only control of a staff lawyer’s judgment 
by those outside the clinic law office, such as a dean or faculty committee, is 
improper under rules of professional conduct.96
Nevertheless, if the right to direct a subordinate lawyer resides with a 
clinical program director, that should be made clear in advance. While junior 
lawyers at a law firm or legal services offices may understand that partners 
or managing attorneys can direct them in a particular case or legal matter, 
most professors would be surprised if a clinical program director claimed 
such absolute authority unless this control was made explicit. Clarifying this 
relationship is especially important when the program director holds a faculty 
rank equal to or less than other faculty in the clinical program.
Defining the Boundaries of Academic Freedom and  
Professional Responsibilities When Lawyering in the Academy
Having analyzed three types of internal influences on case decisions, 
we offer the following framework for defining the boundaries of academic 
freedom and professional responsibility norms when a professor practices law 
in the academy.
First, there is no professional responsibility norm that prevents 
administrators or faculty from imposing prior restrictions on the types of cases 
or other legal matters that a professor may be undertake. Academic freedom 
norms recognize that the faculty acting collectively has the authority to impose 
limits on a course’s subject matter and methods of instruction. However, the 
limits the faculty as a group imposes on client representation courses should be 
consistent with limits it imposes on other types of courses. Academic freedom 
norms also allow intervention by a dean or other university official only in 
exceptional circumstances. In addition, limits based on grounds other than 
educational merit or ethical norms are contrary to the educational mission of 
the law school.
Law schools also should follow the ABA’s ethics opinion that schools not 
reject otherwise appropriate legal matters in order to avoid creating public 
controversy or antagonizing influential public officials.97 Where the faculty 
believes that limitations on the legal matters or clients represented or on the 
means of representation are justified, the faculty should act in a way that is 
consistent with academic freedom norms applicable to other courses. The 
faculty also should strive to avoid possible disputes and misunderstandings 
with individual faculty members by making explicit, in writing, the types of 
96. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 334 (1974).
97. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1208 (1972).
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legal matters that may and may not be accepted for representation and the 
procedures for determining which particular matters to accept.
Second, once the faculty has approved the types of matters a clinic or 
seminar may handle, it should not vest case-by-case veto authority in the 
dean or other outside authority. Doing so infringes on the academic freedom 
traditionally vested in the teacher. Leaving case-by-case decision making with 
the professor also helps insulate the law school and dean from outside attacks, 
especially if there are clear case acceptance guidelines.98 In a sense, if a dean 
can choose the case, then it would appear that Colin Powell’s Pottery Barn 
rule of foreign policy would apply—“you break it, you own it.”99 That is, if the 
dean can veto legal matters, then the dean assumes responsibility for the legal 
matters that are accepted. In addition, when the dean keeps her distance, the 
law school and university authorities are able to attribute case decisions to 
the professor’s academic freedom.100 Indeed, some law school faculty reiterate 
the school’s neutrality by inserting disclaimers in clinic documents indicating 
that the clinic does not purport to represent the position of the law school or 
university on the matter in dispute.101
Unfortunately many nonlawyers, and even some lawyers, have a difficult 
time separating the lawyer from the client represented even when there is 
a claim of neutrality. A law school dean often has to educate the university 
administration, both administrators and trustees, about the role of lawyers in 
representing clients. New deans, and even experienced deans who have not 
yet faced questions concerning clinic matters, would benefit from discussing 
strategies to deflect interference with more experienced deans and clinical 
faculty.102 We do not underestimate how difficult it may at times be to fend 
off this outside interference, but we believe that ultimately this is the wisest 
approach and most consistent with academic freedom norms.
Each law school should also make explicit the role of the clinic director 
in the undertaking of new legal matters.103 In the absence of a prior policy 
98. See Susan Hansen, Backlash on the Bayou, American Lawyer, Jan.–Feb. 1998, at 51 (reporting 
on the dean’s justifications for not intervening in a controversial law clinic case).
99. Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack 150 (Simon & Schuster, New York, 2004).
100. See, e.g., Eamon N. Kelly, Faculty Views Are Their Own, Not Tulane’s, Times-Picayune (New 
Orleans, La.), Sept. 30, 1993, at B6.
101. Kuehn & Joy, supra note 9, at 2004 n.151.
102. External interference in clinical programs is a frequent topic at new dean training sessions 
and most deans experience some inquiry over the work done by their clinical programs from 
alumni, trustees, university administrators, and others. Interview with Kent Syverud, Dean, 
Washington University School of Law in St. Louis, in St. Louis, Mo. (Aug. 6, 2008). 
103. Indeed, when the clinical program is organized as a single law firm, the best practice is 
to have a written policy clearly delineating the authority structure and the rights and 
responsibilities of all faculty in the clinic. A written policy may especially benefit junior 
faculty and others without security of position by providing them with clear lines of 
authority for their lawyering.
Lawyering in the Academy
122 Journal of Legal Education
granting the director supervisory authority over the professional legal work 
of the clinical professor, the director should respect the academic freedom 
of a particular professor to decide which legal matters are best for students, 
provided the faculty member’s decision is consistent with established case 
guidelines. Should the director disagree with the professor’s decision, the 
director should seek a prospective change in the types of legal matters that the 
clinic or professor may handle in the same way that prospective changes are 
made to the coverage of other courses in the law school’s curriculum.
Third, with respect to ongoing cases, once the attorney-client relationship is 
formed, professional responsibility norms are paramount, generally granting 
the professor sole discretion, in consultation with the client, to make case 
decisions. Absent professional misconduct by the professor or a pre-existing 
agreement allowing the clinical program director’s explicit involvement as a 
supervisory attorney, the fact that the professor is paid by the law school or has 
a subordinate faculty rank does not justify interference.
Even if the clinical program director has a case-by-case supervisory role, 
the director must always consider whether intervention in an ongoing 
matter is worth the potential damage to the director’s relationship with the 
other professor. In addition, the program director must consider how such 
intervention might affect the goal of modeling the highest professional ideals 
in the clinic and the relationship between the professor and his students. Any 
intervention is likely to stigmatize the professor among students and should 
be avoided unless required to prevent or correct professional misconduct or 
liability. Academic freedom norms require, at the very least, that any intervention 
into a professor’s representation of a client should be limited in scope and 
respectful of the professor’s existing relationship with the students and client. 
Interventions also have a chilling effect on how other professors exercise their 
professional judgment whenever an administrator or other influential person 
expresses disapproval. Except in rare situations, disagreements about the 
handling of a case are best left for discussion and possible policy changes after 
the matter is resolved.
Fourth, but no less important, a faculty member lawyering in the academy 
should not face discharge, contract non-renewal, or other penalty over a case or 
client decision. As we have noted throughout, these decisions are educational 
as well as professional—educational because the case or other legal matter is the 
means to teach students and professional because the decisions are a necessary 
part of client representation. Only actions that violate a clearly articulated law 
school policy or a significant ethical obligation to the client rise to the point 
of “good cause” for personnel actions under academic freedom principles.104
104. See William Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General Issue 
of Civil Liberty, in The Concept of Academic Freedom 59, 71 (Edmund L. Pincoffs ed., 
University of Texas, Austin, 1975) (arguing that academic freedom provides faculty with the 
freedom to pursue teaching “without vocational jeopardy or threat of other sanction, save 
only upon adequate demonstration of an inexcusable breach of professional ethics in the 
exercise of that freedom”).
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As discussed previously, academic freedom norms apply to all engaged 
in teaching, without regard to whether the person is eligible for tenure or 
teaching outside the classroom. Therefore, those norms should provide the 
same protection against employment sanctions that a tenured classroom 
faculty member enjoys.105 Unless the faculty member is free to pursue a client’s 
objectives without fear of retribution for displeasing a dean or others who 
control salary, promotion and perquisites, the faculty member will be placed 
in a personal conflict situation with the client that would require the client’s 
informed consent.
Thus, it is generally only in prospective case selection that the faculty as 
a whole or the clinical program director may seek limits on the professional 
decisions of a professor lawyering in the academy. The faculty, on its own 
or through delegating the right to the dean or a committee, may set intake 
guidelines if such action is consistent with the academic norms of the law school 
and the limits the faculty imposes in other courses. Once the case is accepted, 
the dean or faculty has no right to intervene in the ongoing professional 
relationship between the professor-attorney and client. Where the clinical 
program is organized as a single law office, the clinical program director may 
be involved in establishing intake guidelines and other intake decisions. Even 
if a clinical program director has a supervisory role over the clinical faculty 
member, a director’s intervention in ongoing matters should be very limited. 
Finally, a faculty member who does not violate stated law school policies and 
acts ethically in making a case decision or other professional judgment should 
not face negative repercussions in the law school.
Conclusion
As a practical matter, we do not suggest that a professor’s academic freedom 
rights and professional responsibility obligations should govern all issues 
involving lawyering in the academy. The dean, clinical program director, and 
faculty acting as a governing body all have a role in the development and 
implementation of the law school’s instructional program. Nevertheless, when 
the issue is not whether the legal matter handled by the professor-lawyer has 
appropriate educational merit but, instead, whether it might put the university 
or law school in an uncomfortable position, schools should respect the 
academic freedom of the professor and the professional responsibilities of the 
lawyer. Everyone in the legal academy should model the highest professional 
and ethical ideals and recognize the important place of law professors and law 
schools in providing representation for indigent and unpopular clients and in 
105. “Adequate cause for a dismissal will be related, directly and substantially, to the fitness of 
faculty members in their professional capacities as teachers or researchers. Dismissal will not 
be used to restrain faculty members in their exercise of academic freedom or other rights of 
American citizens.” AAUP, Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom 
and Tenure Reg. 5(a) (2005), in Redbook, supra note 1, at 22, 26.
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advancing social justice. If these higher ideals are kept in mind, then disputes 
over the proper role of professors in a particular case can be resolved in a 
way that does not harm students, clients, or the principles to which the legal 
profession and the legal academy aspire.
